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Apparently things are really going well at Vicksburg for the south. Only two days ago they reported that Pemberton had enough supplies for four months, and now they’ve got enough for five. At this rate, by the end of the month, they’ll be able to hold out for years.

Richmond Daily Dispatch

Atlanta, May23

–Grant entered the State of Mississippi by crossing the river five miles below Grand Gulf, with from sixty to one hundred thousand men, including a heavy force of cavalry.

He has received no reinforcements from Louisiana, but receives accessions constantly from the west bank of the river. His transportation is all on the river, and must cling to the river bank.

We evacuated Grand Gulf, falling back and fighting towards Jackson, followed by the enemy, who entered Jackson with 50,000 men on the 16th.

Gen. Johnston reached Jackson on the 13th, and fell back to Canton. The Yankees committed various excesses during their two days occupation of Jackson, such as burning churches and private houses, tearing jewelry from the persons of citizens, gutting residences, etc. They then fled towards Vicksburg, followed by Gen. Johnston who is constantly receiving reinforcements.

Vicksburg has five months supplies of every kind, and can be taken only when the force defending it has exhausted these supplies.
The Yankees report the capture of Alexandria, La, but the report is not credited.

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Grant discussed the situation at Vicksburg with his senior officers; it was a rare instance where he came close to a council of war, and he was persuaded to try another assault. Sherman felt that his first try against the Stockade Redan, on the northeast side of Vicksburg, had been handicapped by the lack of time to prepare and lack of knowledge of the terrain. The abatis all around the fortifications, constructed of downed trees tangled together with telegraph wire, disrupted the order of march and exposed his troops to sniper fire. Sherman determined to send in columns on a narrow front to punch through at a single weak point, then reinforce the break.

Unfortunately, the small column presented a tempting target for all the sharpshooters along the parapets. Sherman’s troops took heavy casualties and had to fall back. The repulse of this second attempt was enough to convince everyone that a siege was necessary.

Sherman’s report from the Official Records:

On the 21st, General Grant issued his orders for a general assault by all the army at 10 a. m. on the 22nd, the assault to be rapid by the heads of columns. I placed Blair’s DIVISION at the head of the road, Tuttle’s in support, and left General Steele to make his attack at a point in his front about half a mile to the right. The troops were grouped so that the movement could be connected and rapid. The road lies on the crown of an inferior ridge, rises over comparatively smooth ground along the edge of the ditch of the face of the enemy’s bastion, and enters the parapet at the shoulder of the bastion. No men could be seen in the enemy’s works, except occasionally a sharpshooter would show his head and quickly discharge his piece. A line of select skirmishers was placed to keep them down; also a volunteer storming party of about 150 men, carrying boards and poles to cross the ditch. This, with a small interval, was followed by Ewing’s brigade; this by Giles SMITH’s, and Kilby SMITH’s bringing up the rear of Blair’s DIVISION.

All marched by the flank, following a road selected the night before, by which the men were partially sheltered until it was necessary to take the crown of the ridge and expose themselves to the full view of the enemy, known to be lying concealed behind his well-planned parapet. At the very minute named in General Grant’s orders, the storming party dashed up the road at the double-quick, followed by Ewing’s brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio leading. The artillery of Wood’s, Barrett’s, Waterhouse’s, Spoor’s, and Hart’s batteries kept a concentric fire on the bastion, which was doubtless constructed to command this very approach.

The storming party reached the salient of the bastion and passed toward the sally port, when rose, from every part commanding it, a double rank of the enemy, that poured on the head of the column a terrific fire. It halted, wavered, and sought cover. The rear pressed on, but the fire was so terrific that very soon all sought cover.

The head of the column crossed the ditch of the left face of the bastion and climbed upon the exterior slope, where the colors were planted, and the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from the flank fire. The leading brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that point, the next brigade of Giles SMITH was turned down a ravine, and by a circuit to the left found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet about 300 yards to the left of the bastion, and the brigade of Kilby SMITH deployed on the off slope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing’s brigade, they kept up a constant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet.

About 2 p. m. General Blair reported to me that none of his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire encountered by Ewing’s, but that Giles SMITH had got a position to the left, in connection with General Ransom, of McPherson’s corps, and was ready to assault.

I ordered a constant fire of artillery and infantry to be kept up to occupy the attention of the enemy in our front. Under these circumstances Ransom’s and Giles SMITH’s brigades charged up against the parapet, but also met a staggering fire, before which they recoiled under cover of the hillside.

At the same time, while McPherson’s whole corps was engaged, and having heard General McClernand’s report to General Grant, that he had taken three of the enemy’s forts, and that his flags floated on the stronghold of Vicksburg, I ordered General Tuttle to send directly to the assault one of his brigades. He detailed General Mower’s, and while General Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and I could hear heavy firing all down the line to my left, I ordered their charge, covered in like manner by Blair’s DIVISION, deployed on the hillside, and the artillery posted behind parapets within point-blank range.

General Mower carried his brigade up bravely and well, but again arose a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault, with exactly a similar result. The colors of the leading regiment, the Eleventh Missouri, were planted by the side of that of Blair’s storming party, and remained there till withdrawn after nightfall by my orders.

McClernand’s report of success must have been premature, for I subsequently learned that both his and McPherson’s assault had failed to break through the enemy’s line of intrenchments, and were equally unsuccessful as my own.

At the time we were so hotly engaged along the road, General Steele, with his DIVISION, made his assault at a point about midway from the bastion and Mississippi River. The ground over which he passed was more open and exposed to the flank fire of the enemy’s batteries in position, and was deeply cut up by gullies and washes; still, his column passed steadily through this fire and reached the parapet, which was also found to be well manned and defended by the enemy. He could not carry the works, but held possession of the hillside till night, when he withdrew his command to his present position. These several assaults, made simultaneously, demonstrated the strength of the natural and artificial defenses of Vicksburg, that they are garrisoned by a strong force, and that we must resort to regular approaches.

Our loss during the day was severe, and the proportion of dead to wounded exceeds the usual ratio. The loss in my corps for the attack of May 22 will not fall much short of 600 killed and wounded.

Our skirmishers still remain close up to the enemy’s works, while the troops are retired a short distance in the ravines, which afford good cover. Strong working parties are kept employed in opening roads to the rear and preparing covered roads to the front. By taking advantage of the shape of the ground, I think we can advance our workyards of the redoubt which commands the road, after which the regular sap must be resorted to. Captain Jenney, engineer of my staff, has organized the parties, and will set to work immediately at two distinct points, one in Blair’s and the other in Steele’s front.

Our position is now high, healthy, and good. We are in direct and easy communication with our supplies, and the troops continue to manifest the same cheerful spirit which has characterized them throughout this whole movement.

I have as yet received no detailed reports of my DIVISION commanders. Indeed, our means of transportation have been so limited and our time so constantly employed that but little writing has been done; but as soon as possible I will supply you with accurate reports of all the details of events herein sketched, with names of killed and wounded, and the names of such officers and men as deserve mention for special acts of zeal and gallantry.

I have sent in about 500 prisoners, with lists of their names, rank, regiments, &c., and now inclose the papers relating to those paroled at Jackson, MISS.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

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The Richmond Daily Dispatch reassures its readers that there’s nothing to worry about at Vicksburg. They’ve got four months’ worth of provisions! And Johnston will soon arrive with reinforcements to lift the siege.

Affairs at Vicksburg.

We present under our telegraphic head all the news we have from this important point. It is natural that much anxiety should be felt with reference to the defence of this place, and, without presuming to know more than others, we predict that all will be well there on the great day of trial of strength between the two armies. There is nothing, in our judgment, in the recent repulse of Gen. Pemberton to lead to the belief that there is any danger of the fall, immediate or remote, of Vicksburg. We are informed from various sources that our forces within the entrenchments, extending from the city as far back as the Big Black, have a supply of provisions sufficient to subsist them for four months.

In the late fight only a portion of our forces were engaged, and Gen. Johnston, who is now in command of all the forces employed for the protection of the place, with the reinforcements sent to his aid, had not arrived in time to participate in the struggle. His dispatch the day subsequent to the fight was dated forty miles from the scene of the engagement. From all we can gather we are decidedly hopeful as to the final issue.

The New York Times reports that black regiments are being organized. But the recruits have a condition; they want the President to push the South to treat captured black soldiers as prisoners of war. While efforts were made repeatedly, they were unsuccessful, and the issue caused the North to break off prisoner exchanges until the end of the war. The atrocities at Andersonville, among others, came about in part because the South insisted on punitive treatment for captured black troops.

It is stated at the War Department, that more vigorous measures for calling out the full military strength of the negroes will be made on Adjutant Gen. THOMAS’ return from the West — that officer, alike from his interest in and familiarity with the subject, is considered peculiarly qualified to assume the entire charge of the organization of negro troops, and his return is therefor awaited before rules and regulations therefor are promulgated. The War Department has already received dispatches from him, announcing the complete organization of eleven negro regiments on the Mississippi. Meantime the prospects for negro volunteering continue brighter. In this city enlistments for the first negro regiment are already complete, and steps are already being taken for the organization of the second. Those interested in the work promise also another regiment from Georgetown, and one, if not two more from Alexandria. The District has thus far furnished but two white regiments.

Gen. HEINTZELMAN to-day telegraphed to Gen. SLOUGH, military Governor of Alexandria, asking how many negro troops could be raised there. Gen. SLOUGH replied that he would undertake to raise a brigade, and have them ready for speedy service in the fortifications. From other quarters the indications are not less cheering. Baltimore promises well for at least one regiment, and the southern shore of Maryland for another. Within a circuit of eighty miles around Washington is a population of 160,000 negroes, a large proportion of whom are now within our lines, and available for military service.

At a war meeting of the colored people of this city, held this evening, in furtherance of the organization of a negro regiment, the following resolutions were proposed by W.A. CROFFUT, and unanimously adopted, and a Committee appointed to wait upon the President with a copy of them:

Whereas, The rebel authorities at Richmond, in reply to the announcement by the President of the United States of his intention to employ citizens of African descent in the suppression of the rebellion, proclaimed their determination not to regard such citizens, or their white officers, as prisoners of war, but to subject them to the bloody penalties prescribed in Southern statute-books for persons inciting insurrection among slaves; and,

Whereas, A large number of colored persons, serving in the loyal army as ambulance and wagon drivers, freighters, diggers, servants, &c., either free or those whose freedom was practically assured by the Proclamation of Emancipation, have been captured by the rebels at Murfreesboro, Galveston, Bull Run, Harper’s Ferry and elsewhere, and we have every reason to believe impressed or sold into Slavery, no account, as far as we can ascertain, having ever been rendered of such people as military captives; and

Whereas, The failure of the United States Government to guarantee to its colored citizens captured by the enemy the protection to which their military employment manifestly entitles them, has, in our opinion, retarded the enlistment of that class of troops, and seems to have been construed by the enemy into a submission to their threat; therefore

Resolved, That, when all liberty is involved and the existence of the Republic at stake, classes and conditions are sunk in the magnitude of a common cause, and no soldier is so humble or so weak as to be unworthy of the protection of the Government he faithfully serves.

Resolved, That the President of the United States be and he is hereby respectfully but earnestly requested, to declare, in reply to the inhuman threat of the rebels, the adoption of a policy of retaliation; to-assert an active guardianship of every enlisted man and every citizen covered by the Federal flag; and to pledge to the nation and the world the whole power of the Government for the protection of all Union soldiers, without regard to color, who may be captured by the enemy, the full rights and immunities of prisoners of war.

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Pursuing the retreating Confederates into Vicksburg, Grant was determined to assault the works immediately, rather than give them time to rest and regroup. He ordered all the available troops from his three corps to attack. With insufficient preparation and little knowledge of the terrain, they were unable to make much headway against the formidable defense, natural and constructed, of Vicksburg. A typical report is that of T.K. Smith, from Blair’s division of Sherman’s corps. His brigade did as well as any, but they were unable to gain a foothold on the parapet. They fell back, and, as Smith says, stayed in their position until they got the order to attack again on the 22nd.

From the report of Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith:

As night fell, I ordered the FIFTY-fourth Ohio, with three companies from the One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois as a reserve, to deploy far to my left, with a view of connecting with General Rannson’s picket. Colonel Giles A. Smith meanwhile had advanced and relieved my pickets on the right. Thus we remained resting on our arms till daybreak, when, by orders from General Sherman, I threw the pickets, as skirmishers, forward within close range of the enemy, advancing the brigade in line of battle on either side of what is called the Graveyard road, leading to what was supposed to be a sally-port in the fortifications, the right wing, Eighty-THIRD Indiana and One hundred and twenty seventh Illinois with its left, the left wing, FIFTY-FIFTH Illinois and FIFTY fourth Ohio with its right, upon the road till we reached the crest of a hill 500 yards from the enemy’s works, company B First Illinois Artillery, captain Barret, in position in front, still supported by details from the FIFTY-FIFTH Illinois.

At 9 a. m., the signal being given by Battery A, five shots were fired to get range, when a vigorous fire was opened along the line, skirmishers and sharpshooters pouring in most destructive volleys from sheltered points along the range of hills and close under the parapets.

At 11 o’clock the following order was received from department headquarters, viz:

Corps commanders will push forward carefully, and gain as close position as possible to the enemy’s works, until 2 p. m. ; at that hour they will fire three volleys of artillery from all the pieces in position. This will be the signal for a general charge of all the army corps along the whole line. When the works are carried, guards will be placed by all DIVISION commanders to prevent their men from straggling from their companies.

By order of Major-General Grant,&c.

At 1 o’clock I assembled my pickets, calling in the FIFTY-fourth Ohio. A reconnaissance of the ground over which I should pass had developed the fact that it would be impossible to advance my whole brigade in line of battle, the hills and knobs being exceedingly precipitous, intersected by ravines in three direction, the bottom treacherous, filled with sink holes, concealed by dried grass and cane; the whole covered by abatis of fallen timber form a dense forest cut six months or more ago, affording spikes and cherveraux de frise most difficult to surmount. The roadway alluded to is cut and filled, slightly winding upon a ridge nearly perpendicular to my line of battle, and at its point of intersection fore I placed my right wing, Eighty-THIRD Indiana and One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois command of Colonel Spooner its senior officer, in whose ability and dauntless courage I repose fullest confidence on the right of the road, with instructions to press forward as rapidly as possible, and in such order as he could best get over the ground. I of his line of skirmishers, and Captain Moore, company D, to the FIFTY fourth Ohio, brigade officer of the day, to aid him, I formed the FIFTY FIFTH Illinois with its right upon the road; the FIFTY-fourth Ohio on line with the FIFTY-FIFTH, with orders to guide upon it; and the FIFTY-seventh Ohio immediately in the rear but not in reserve.

At the appointed hour the signal was given, and at the command “forward” the troops advanced gallantly and without hesitation, it was almost vain to assay a line, owing to the nature of the ground, yet three times, under a most galling and destructive fire, did these regiments halt and dress upon their colors; the nerve and self-possession of both officers and men perfect; not a man flinched from his post. Having advanced some 400 yards, I discovered that the men were thoroughly exhausted, and halted the left wing under the crest of a hill from 65 to 75 yards from the ditch and parapet, and where they were comparatively sheltered from the small-arms of the enemy. Returning to reconnoiter the position of my right wing under the crest of a hill, from my view by the embankment of the road, I perceived their colors advanced to the very base of the parapet, and also that my brigade was alone, unsupported on the left or right, save by portion of the Thirteenth Regulars, who Indiana and One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois.

To the left, as far as I could see(and from an elevated point I had great range), not a soldier to be seen, and only an occasional puff of smoke from the riffle of a sharpshooter, concealed far away among the hills, revealed the fact that we had friends near us outside of our DIVISION. Therefore I determined to that my command, report, and wait for further orders, especially as from the position my left wing occupied (that which General Ewing is now fortifying) great execution could be done by my men upon the sharpshooters of the enemy, who from the trees close behind the works, were picking off our officers with devilish skill.

Returning to the front, I sent and aide-de-camp to General Blair with report. I received in answer orders from General Sherman “to get my men as close to the parapet as possible, and be ready to jump in when they began to yield,” coupled with the assurance that McPherson was well engaged, and that General Grant was on the ground, and that the artillery, of the enemy, which began to enfilade us, would be silenced. I ordered my men to cease firing and fix bayonets, with intent to charge, when, upon closer view, I discovered the works too steep and high to scale without proper appliances; a few men could have been got over by the aid of a ladder of bayonets of digging holes in the embankment, but these would have gone to destruction. I could not make a demonstration with my isolated command that would have resulted permanently; therefore I determined to maintain the position and await developments. The sequel to the attempt at assault is my guarantee for the course I pursued.

Meanwhile details were ordered back and ammunition furnished in abundance; the most accurate marksmen were thrown forward, with carte-blanche to select the best cover. Companies were advanced from each regiment and relieved as ammunition gave out or guns became for. A most deadly fire was kept up, and none of the enemy ventured his head above the wall who failed to pay the penalty. At the same time the right wing, with stern determination, maintained their ground. Their loss had been fearful, falling upon their best line and non-commissioned officers. Captain after captain had been shot dead; field-officers were falling; still, there was no flinching. I communicated through my aides.

As night fell, I received a verbal order, through an unusual source, to fall back to my original position. This order was in immediate conflict with two received from General Sherman, and gave me no little surprise. I had won by severe loss the best position to fortify in our whole front. Already I had made arrangements to plant batteries upon the hill I occupied. Reluctantly I left the command with Colonel Rice. Colonel Malmborg, senior officer, having been most painfully wounded in the eye, and went, back in person for report and explanation.

At General Blair’s headquarters I received the following written orders:

Brigade commanders will collect the forces of their respective regiments, and occupy the last ground from which they moved to the assault to-day, where their men will be well covered, advancing a line of skirmishers as near as possible to the enemy’s works, for the purpose of occupying his attention. They will be prepared to assault at day break in the morning.

By order of Major General F. P. Blair,&c.,

At this it had become quite dark, when suddenly the whole scene was brilliantly lighted by the flames of certain wooden houses within the works, ignited by simultaneous action of the enemy for the purpose of discovering our change of movement. This purpose had bee anticipated by Colonel Spooner, who, with skill and good judgment, withdrew from the ditch beneath the parapet to shelter. A few moments later, and hand-grenades and the grave would have been supper and bed for his men.

In pursuance of the last order, I quietly withdrew my command by details. At 3 o’clock in the morning they were in their old position. Here we remained till the morning of the 22nd, instant, when orders issued to all the army corps for a simultaneous attack were received.

Pemberton’s retreating troops burned the bridge over the Big Black River, but McClernand’s engineers worked through the night under sniper fire to replace it. They continued the pursuit on the 18th.

From McClernand’s report in the Official Records:

Driven across the river, the enemy made a feeble stand to cover his trains and retreat upon Vicksburg, but several hours before sunset was dislodged by my forces, leaving tents, a considerable quantity of clothing and other stores, together with a large number of small arms, a smoking ruin.

During the following night and morning a bridge was thrown across the Big Black by the pioneer corps under Captain Patterson.

On the morning of the 18th, I crossed with Generals Osterhaus’, Smith’s, and Carr’s DIVISIONS, of my corps, and took up the line of march for Vicksburg, 12 miles distant. General Smith’s DIVISION led, followed by Generals Osterhaus and Carr, on the Jackson and Vicksburg road to Saint Albans, and thence by a cross road and the Baldwin’s Ferry road at Four Mile Creek, arriving there about sunset, and resting for the night 4 miles from Vicksburg. Several prisoners and wagons were captured during the march. General Osterhaus resumed command of the NINTH DIVISION on the WEST bank of Big Black, and General Lee was assigned to the command of the First Brigade of that DIVISION during the absence of General Garrard, who had been ordered to report to General Prentiss, at Helena.

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Grant’s forces pursued Pemberton’s fleeing Confederates westward after the battle of Champion Hill. They caught up with them at the bridge over the Big Black River, where Pemberton’s troops had put up a fortification of cotton bales. One brigade, led by Brig.Gen. Lawler, found a low-lying area that offered enough shelter to allow them to approach closely to the rebel lines. His troops were able to break through, ultimately leading to the rout of the rebel troops. As Lawler says, “It is, perhaps, worthy of remark that more men were captured by my brigade than I had men in the charge.” The remnants of Pemberton’s army fled in disorder to the west.

Official Records:

Report of Brigadier General Michael K. Lawler, U. S. Army, commanding SECOND Brigade, fourteenth DIVISION,

On the morning of the 17th, by 3. 30 a. m., Carr’s DIVISION was again on the road in pursuit of the enemy, Benton’s brigade having the advance. We came upon the enemy at Big Black Bridge, strongly posted behind skillfully constructed rifle-pits, extending across a neck of land formed by the big Black River, his flanks were protected by this stream, and having in his front, in addition to the riffle-pits, a bayou filled with brush and fallen trees. This, combined with the fact that there were cleared fields of from 400 to 600 yards in width along his whole front from bend to bend of the stream rendered his position really formidable and difficult of approach, subjecting a clearing party, it would seem, to almost certain destruction at the commencement of the contest.

To support Benton’s brigade, orders were received to form the brigade in two lines on both sides of the road, the artillery in the center. Shortly afterward I received orders to change position, and by an oblique movement to the right occupy the ground on the right of Benton’s brigade, and meet a movement the enemy were reported to be making in that direction with a view to flank us. This order having been executed, I was instructed by the brigadier-general commanding the DIVISION to move forward slowly and cautiously with my command, and develop and press, back if possible, the enemy’s left. Accordingly, I ordered Colonel C. L. Harris, eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers, who held the left of our new position, to move his regiment forward, through the woods in his front, his skirmishers covering his advance, and the Twenty-THIRD Iowa, colonel Kinsman, to follow him at a distance of 100 yards as a support. At the same time I advanced the Twenty-first Iowa Volunteers, colonel Samuel Merrill, into the cleared the skirting Big Black River, with instructions to move forward on a line with the Eleventh Wisconsin. The Peoria Battery was left in position on the rising ground in the edge of the field, and the Twenty-SECOND Iowa in rear as a reserve and support.

Meanwhile there had commenced a spirited artillery engagement between the battery of Benton’s brigade and the enemy’s cannon in position behind their works. The skirmishers of the First Brigade were actively engaged, and those of the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers, which regiment advanced steadily forward through the timber to the field in front of the enemy’s works, and distant from them about 400 yards. Here I ordered it to halt, and move down to halt and move down to the right through the field skirting the river, and take position the woods and brush lining this stream. This movement Colonel Harris promptly executed, reaching the position designated without serious loss, though exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy’s sharpshooters. The Twenty-THIRD Iowa, colonel Kinsman, having come up after the Eleventh Wisconsin, was ordered to make a similar movement to the right, and to move up under cover of the river bank and take position on the right of the Eleventh Wisconsin and as close as possible to the enemy’s works and the Twenty-first Iowa, colonel Merrill, to take position on the bank between these two regiments.

I also directed the Peoria Battery to take position in the open field in front of the left of the enemy and to open an enfilading fire on their center batteries, with which the battery of Benton’s brigade was engaged. At the same time the Twenty- SECOND Iowa, colonel Stone, was ordered to move forward on the left of the field to within supporting distance. These orders were quickly responded to, and the position thus occupied by the brigade continued to be held without material variation. During the greater part of the forenoon heavy but ineffectual musketry firing was kept up by the enemy upon my men, briskly responded to by our sharpshooters, late in the forenoon, finding it impossible to press farther forward along the river bank toward the enemy, as I had intended, colonel Kinsman, twenty-THIRD Iowa Volunteers, proposed to charge at once the enemy’s works and drive them out at the point of the bayonet, and asked my consent to the same. Foreseeing that a charge by a single regiment, unsustained by the whole line, against fortifications as formidable as those in his front, could hardly be successful, at the same time I gave my consent to this daring proposition I determined that there should be a simultaneous movement on the part of my whole command.

Accordingly, the Twenty-first Iowa Volunteers, colonel Merrill, was ordered to charge with the Twenty-THIRD, the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers following close upon them as a support, and the Twenty-SECOND Iowa, colonel William M. Stone-which had in the mean time crossed the field ant taken position on the river bank on the right of the Eleventh Wisconsin-were ordered to move out into the field and act as a reserve force. Two guns of the Peoria Battery, and 20-pounder Parrott, belonging to the First Wisconsin Battery, were in position in the field, actively at work upon the enemy and doing good service. In addition, orders had been sent to the Forty-NINTH and Sixty-NINTH Indiana Volunteers-two regiments which had been sent from Osterhaus’ DIVISION to support. Orders were further given that the men should reserve their fire until upon the rebel works.

Finally the regiments that were to lead the charge were formed, with bayonets fixed, in the edge of the woods on the river bank. All things being in readiness, the command “forward”was give by Colonel Kinsman, and at once his noble regiment sprang forward to the works. The twenty-first, led on by Colonel Merrill, moved at the same instant the Eleventh Wisconsin, colonel Harris, closely following. Through a terrible fire of musketry from the enemy in front and a galling fire from his sharpshooters on the right, these brave men dashed bravely on. Kinsman fell, dangerously wounded, before half the distance was accomplished. Struggling to his fee, the staggered a few paces to the front, cheered forward his men, and fell again, this time to rise no more, pierced through by a SECOND ball. Colonel Merrill, the brave commander of the Twenty-first Iowa, fell wounded early in the charge, while gallantly leading his regiment against the enemy. Immediately Lieutenant-Colonel Glasgow placed himself at the head of the Twenty-THIRD, and Major Van Anda led on the Twenty-first. Undismayed by the loss of their colonels, and by the perfect hail storm of bullets pounded into them with destructive effect, the men of the Twenty-THIRD and Twenty-first Iowa and the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers pressed onward, nearer and nearer, to the rebel works, over the open field, 500 yards, under a wasting fire, and up to the edge of the bayou.

Halting here only long enough [to cross] the bayou filled with water, fallen timber, and brush, on to the rebel works with the shout of victors, driving the enemy in with confusion form their breastworks and riffle-pits, and entering in triumph the rebel stronghold. Hurrying forward the Forty-NINTH and Sixty-NINTH Indiana and Twenty-SECOND Iowa Volunteers, I sent the two Indiana regiments to the support of my left, and ordered the Iowa regiment to move against the support of my left, and ordered the Iowa regiment to move against the extreme left of the enemy’s works, where they, several hundred strong, still held out, while the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers was directed to occupy the ground between the enemy and the bridge, and thus cut off their retreat. The movement was successful.

The rebels broke and fled before the Twenty-SECOND Iowa, and fell an easy prey into the hands of the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers. Those of the rebels who were not captured hastened to make good their retreat over the bridge. As the result of this successful charge, we may with justice claim that it gave our army entire possession of the enemy’s extended lines of works, and with them their field artillery (eighteen pieces in all), a large quantity of ammunition, thousands of small-arms, and 3,000 prisoners. By our brigade were captured 1,460 small-arms, several hundred accoutermets, chiefly collected by the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers, 1, 120 prisoner, and 4 stand of colors.

It is, perhaps, worthy of remark that more men were captured by my brigade than I had men in the charge; but this brilliant success was not accomplished without considerable loss; 145 killed and 185 wounded in the space of three minutes, the time occupied in reaching the enemy’s works, attest the severity of the fire to which my men were subjected.

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Grant sent McPherson east from Clinton toward Edwards’ Station, where he expected to meet Pemberton’s advance. He ordered McClernand to move northwest from Raymond toward the same goal, and Sherman to move west from Jackson. His plan was to bring the three corps together to concentrate against Pemberton. One of McClernand’s divisions, led by General Hovey, was already on the Jackson road, and Hovey soon ran into Pemberton’s advancing troops at Champion Hill. Grant quickly ordered an attack, and sent reinforcements. As it turned out, due to a courier who didn’t know the terrain, McClernand didn’t authorize an attack until very late in the day. The Confederates were outnumbered most of the time, although the involvement of forces on both sides in the battle was very uneven due to the difficult topography. Nevertheless, Pemberton was forced to retreat with considerable losses. Grant, as always, was not content to gain ground; he held McClernand responsible for the escape of most of Pemberton’s army.

For a detailed account, I recommend Grabau’s “Ninety-Eight Days”, as always for the Vicksburg campaign. Here I give an excerpt from Grant’s memoirs that tells the story more briefly.

Grant’s Memoirs:

About five o’clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton’s army in the night, and that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after receiving this order Steele’s division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Edward’s station. McClernand was directed to embrace Blair in his command for the present. Blair’s division was a part of the 15th army corps (Sherman’s); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow Hovey’s division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward’s station, over which to march his troops. Hovey’s division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy.

Smith’s division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy’s pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy’s pickets and forced them back to the main line. About the same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey’s trains occupying the roads. I was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey’s skirmishing amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy’s position than McPherson. I sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand’s advance.

Champion’s Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker’s Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edward’s station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker’s Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward’s station, some three miles west of Champion’s Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand’s corps, and Blair of Sherman’s, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey of McClernand’s command was with McPherson, farther north on the road from Bolton direct to Edward’s station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to Baker’s Creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward’s station. Pemberton’s lines covered all these roads, and faced east. Hovey’s line, when it first drove in the enemy’s pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o’clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy’s line, and they did good execution.

From Logan’s position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker’s Creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two brigades from McPherson’s command, confronted the enemy’s left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s, were confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur’s division of the 17th corps (McPherson’s), had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more reinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson’s command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between three and four o’clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr’s division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey’s division, and McPherson’s two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.

The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion’s Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey’s division and of McPherson’s two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. Osterhaus’s and A. J. Smith’s divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy’s line. McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. This excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand’s command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing—more than one-third of his division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring’s division, which was the right of Pemberton’s line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

Click for large map.

The message that Fred Grant saw his father receive in Jackson was a captured order from Johnston to Pemberton, saying that their armies should meet in Clinton. Grant was puzzled, as Johnston should have known the Union held Clinton, but he decided to move that way anyway, in hopes of defeating Pemberton before they could join forces.

Here McClernand passes on Grant’s order to move west, along with a hint that really McClernand is telling Grant what to do. McClernand never misses a chance for self-promotion.

Official Records:

BOLTON, MISS., May 15, 1863-4. 45 p. m.
Major General F. P. BLAIR:

GENERAL: I have the honor to communicate the following order from Major-General Grant to me:

GENERAL: Move your command early to-morrow toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the force of the enemy, should you encounter him, and without bringing on an engagement, unless you feel entirely able to contend with him.
Communicate this order to Major-General Blair, who will move with you.

General, in explanation, I would say that I have been reconnoitering and skirmishing at intervals all day. Hovey’s DIVISION is disposed on the right and next to the railroad; Osterhaus in the center, to which I will also move Carr as a reserve; and you on the left, to be co-operated with by Smith when he comes.

Circumstances, of course, may alter this plan. You may move your DIVISION at 5 o’clock in the morning from Raymond northwest about 1 1/2 miles to the forks of the road, and follow the Edwards Station road. Keep up communication with Osterhaus and Carr, on your right. The purpose is first to feel the enemy, and then engage him, if we find it can be done with success.
I will be near the center. Communicate with me often.

I have suggested to General Grant to move McPherson on the north side of the railroad, to cut off the escape of the enemy, if we should engage and beat him.

JOHN A. McClernand.

The Union troops made a dash from Raymond northeast to take Jackson, MS.

Official Records:

JACKSON, MISS., May 14, 1863.
Major General John A. McClernand, Comdg. Thirteenth Army Corps:

Our troops carried this place about 3 o’clock this p. m. after a brisk fight of about three hours. The enemy retreated north toward Canton; Johnston in command. It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us, and cross the Black River and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this. Turn all your forces toward Bolton Station, and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order.

Sherman and McPherson will immediately retrace their steps, only detaining a force to destroy the railroads north and east.

U. S. GRANT,
HDQRS. THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, May 14, 1863.

Grant’s 12-year-old son Fred accompanied his father on the Vicksburg campaign, and during the attack on Jackson he went on alone, slipping into the town, hiding from retreating Confederates, and pilfering the Governor’s pipe. He reminisced about his experiences in an article for the New Outlook magazine in 1898:

Frederick Dent Grant, “With Grant at Vicksburg”.

We spent the night at Raymond and then started for Jackson, the capital of Mississippi. While passing through a piece of dense woods on the way the enemy’s sharpshooters opened fire on us. One of the staff shouted to my father that they were aiming at him. His answer was to turn his horse and dash into the woods in the direction whence the bullets were coming. Colonels Wilson and Lagow, I, the orderlies, and the escort followed, and in skirmishing fashion we advanced till we came to a large house, where we halted.

Sherman’s corps now came up, and McPherson was already engaged. Generals Grant and Sherman were on the porch of the house when our line was broken by artillery fire and our men began a retreat. The generals immediately mounted, rode among the men, and reformed them. Meanwhile, Tuttle’s division had passed through the woods and had captured the enemy’s breastworks, and, wheeling to the left, advanced up the line of intrenchments. Father accompanied them.

Thinking the battle was ended, I rode off toward the State House, where the Confederate troops passed me in their retreat. Though I wore a blue uniform, I was so splashed with mud and looked generally so unattractive that the Confederates paid no attention to me. I have since realized that even had I been captured it would not have ended the war.

At this time I saw a mounted officer with a Union flag advancing toward the Capitol. I followed him into the building and entered the Governor’s room, which had been hastily abandoned. Finding what I supposed to be the Governor’s pipe lying on the table, I confiscated it, primarily and ostensibly for the National service, but secondarily and actually for my own private and individual use. It had the advantage of being still loaded and lighted.

Returning to the street, I saw the officer whom I had followed in the act of raising the Union flag over the building. He proved to be Captain, afterwards Colonel, Cornelius Cadle.

Father and his staff, advancing at the head of the army, soon reached the State House, where I Joined them, and went with them to the Bowen House, the best hotel in Jackson, where we took the room in which General Joseph E. Johnston had slept the night before.

At Jackson we captured an important prisoner who was carrying dispatches from Johnston to Pemberton. The information gained from these dispatches caused some activity at headquarters, and the next day — May 15 — the army started off in the direction Of Vicksburg.

That night, while sleeping in the room with my father at Clinton, I was awakened by a great knocking. Colonel Lagow announced the arrival of a messenger from McPherson, and father seemed surprised at the news he received. He gave orders for an early start in the morning, went back to bed, and was soon sleeping quietly again.

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